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ABSTRACT 
This study investigates whether participation in the Junior Reserve Offices 
Training Corps (JROTC) and other youth programs significantly affects the performance 
of first-term Navy enlistees. This analysis makes use of multivariate models to estimate 
the causal effect of JROTC participation on first-term attrition, promotion and 
reenlistment. 
The analysis uses data from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) 
enlisted personnel cohort files for Fiscal Years (FY) 1994 to 2002.  The analysis finds 
that participation in JROTC reduces first-term attrition and increases the probability of 
reenlistment, but also reduces the probability of promotion. This latter result is in part due 
to the Navy’s hierarchical structure, which limits the number of promotions combined 
with the fact that JROTC enlistees tend to enter at higher grades. The results also show 
that females who participate in JROTC reenlist at higher rates than males. These findings 
are relevant to policy-makers when determining the future of the JROTC program. By 
investing early in this program, the Navy could generate substantial cost savings in the 
form of recruiting and training costs. I would recommend that a cost benefit analysis 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. OVERVIEW OF THE JUNIOR RESERVE OFFICER TRAINING 
CORPS..............................................................................................................1 
B. BACKGROUND OF THE JROTC PROGRAM .........................................2 
C. PURPOSE AND SCOPE.................................................................................3 
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY.............................................................4 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW ...........................................................................................5 
A. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................5 
1. Attrition ................................................................................................5 
2.  Promotion .............................................................................................7 
3.  Reenlistment .........................................................................................8 
B. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................11 
III.  DATA DESCRIPTION .............................................................................................13 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................13 
B. DMDC COHORT DATA..............................................................................14 
C.  VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS .....................................................................14 
1.  Dependent Variables..........................................................................14 
2.  Independent Variables.......................................................................15 
D.  DATA SAMPLES AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS............................17 
IV.  METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................................23 
A.  INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................23 
1.  Models for First Year Attrition and First-Term Attrition.............23 
2.  Model of Promotion to E4 or E5 in the First-term .........................23 
3. Reenlistment Models..........................................................................24 
B.  HYPOTHESIZED EFFECTS OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES........25 
V.  RESULTS ...................................................................................................................27 
A.  ONE-YEAR ATTRITION RATES..............................................................27 
B.  FIRST-TERM ATTRITION.........................................................................30 
C.  PROMOTION TO E4 OR E5.......................................................................34 
D.  REENLISTMENT MODELS.......................................................................39 
VI.  CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................47 
A.  INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................47 
B.  IMPLICATIONS OF STUDY ......................................................................47 
C.  FUTURE RESEARCH..................................................................................47 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................49 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 ix
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Dependent Variable Descriptions ....................................................................15 
Table 2. Independent Variable Descriptions..................................................................15 
Table 3. Recruit Participation numbers..........................................................................17 
Table 4. Recruit Distributions by Gender by Youth Programs......................................18 
Table 5. Recruit Distribution by Race and Ethnicity by Youth Programs.....................19 
Table 6. Education, AFQT CAT Groups, and AFQT Percentile Scores by Youth 
Programs ..........................................................................................................20 
Table 7. Distribution of Entry Rank by Youth Programs ..............................................20 
Table 8. Attrition, Promotion, and Reenlistment Rates for Demographic Categories...21 
Table 9. Pay grade distribution by fourth year...............................................................24 
Table 10. Hypothesized effects of Explanatory Variables...............................................25 
Table 11. Logistic Regression Estimates of One-Year Attrition .....................................28 
Table 12. Partial Effects from One-Year Attrition Models .............................................29 
Table 13. Logistic Regression Estimates of First-Term Attrition....................................31 
Table 14. Partial Effects From First-Term Attrition models ...........................................33 
Table 15. Logistic Regression Estimates of Promotion to E4 or E5................................35 
Table 16. Partial Effects From Promotion to E4 or E5 Models.......................................37 
Table 17. Promotion over 4 years ....................................................................................39 
Table 18. Logistic Regression Estimates of Reenlistment...............................................40 
Table 19. Partial Effects from Reenlistment Models.......................................................42 
Table 20. Logistic Regression Estimates of Reenlistment models for All, Females 
only, and Males Only.......................................................................................44 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I discovered early on that the thesis process was going to be very challenging and 
interesting. There are several people that helped me in the successful completion of my 
thesis. First of all, I would like to thank Professors Steven Mehay and Elda Pema for 
guiding me through the process and spending numerous hours pointing me in the right 
direction. I thank Professor Mehay for his countless hours of correcting my grammar and 
spelling errors and Professor Pema for her guidance and direction in developing the 
numerous models for my study. I deeply thank you both. I would also like to thank Kathy 
Kocher who has been instrumental teaching me SAS and helping with my empirical 
analysis. Also, I would like to thank John McLaughlin from DMDC for helping with the 
construction of my cohort data, without which the data mining process would have been 
arduous. Last but not least I would like to thank my Wife Christin and children Casey, 


























A. OVERVIEW OF THE JUNIOR RESERVE OFFICER TRAINING CORPS 
The first JROTC program was established by the passage of the National Defense 
Act of 1916, which established the program for students over the age of 14 attending high 
school. Under this act the military was authorized to loan equipment and active or retired 
personnel to high schools as long as the school allowed the military personnel to teach 
approved military courses. The school was also required to have at least 100 students 
participate in the program every year, or 10% of the school enrollment, if the high school 
had fewer than 1000 students.1 The first JROTC programs consisted of three hours of 
military training per week for a period of three years. Any JROTC graduate who 
completed this course of instruction (COI) was eligible to receive a reserve commission 
at age 21. However, after WWI the need for officers decreased and the authorization to 
grant a commission was eliminated.  
Government support for the JROTC program in its first 23 years (1916-1939) was 
reduced because of budgetary issues. Due to these funding constraints and a lack of 
support by the armed forces themselves, the program saw little growth. Also, many of the 
high schools that hosted the program would schedule the classes and training at 
inconvenient times (lunch time or after school). Due to these scheduling problems many 
students lost interest in the program. However, in 1963 President Kennedy signed Public 
Law 88-647, the ROTC Vitalization Act, which reinvigorated the JROTC program. This 
law required the armed forces to increase support, funding, and the number of JROTC 
programs under their control.  
After the Vietnam War and the end of the draft, the JROTC program was seen as 
a tool the armed forces could use to entice new recruits into the military. Public support 
of the military was at an all time low even though the United States was focused on 
increasing the size of its military forces to combat the threat of communists during the 
Cold War with the Soviet Union. The armed forces provided benefits to personnel who 
attended the JROTC program. If a JROTC graduate joined the military they were offered 
an advanced pay grade upon enlistment, such as E3 or E4, based on their time spent and                                                  
1 JROTC Universe, January 2007, < http://www.geocities.com/pentagon/bunker/5841/Units.html >. 
2 
rank held in their JROTC program. Qualified JROTC graduates were even given 
preferential treatment in being selected to any of the Military Academies.  During the 
early 1970’s the JROTC program opened its doors to female students. Prior to 1972 no 
females were allowed to join or participate in the program. However, as of 1993, females 
made up over 40% of the JROTC participants. The Air Force, Navy, and Marines JROTC 
programs were established in 1964 under passage of Title 10, U.S. Code, chapter 102.2 
Each of the separate services programs was very similar to the Army’s JROTC program 
with the exception that the other three services teach service-specific material.  
The goals of the JROTC program include promoting leadership, patriotism, 
community service, and providing information on military service as a possible career. 
However, the program also helps develop students into well-informed and responsible 
citizens who have respect for teachers, police, and elders. Students of the program are 
given all the tools to develop leadership and become better citizens of the community. 
The JROTC provides an alternative to joining gangs and promotes living a healthy and 
drug-free life style.  In order to participate in any of today’s JROTC programs, a student 
must be enrolled in and attending a regular course of instruction (COI) at the high school 
hosting the program in grades 9 through 12.  Students must be physically fit and qualified 
to participate in all physical education programs of the host school; furthermore, the 
student must maintain a set standard of academic grades and an academic standing that 
leads to high school graduation.  Standards of conduct must be adhered to and students 
must meet specified personal grooming standards (similar to military standards).   
B. BACKGROUND OF THE JROTC PROGRAM 
As of June 2006, there were 1,555 Army JROTC units, 794 Air Force JROTC units, 
619 Navy JROTC units, 260 Marine Corps JROTC units, and 1 Coast Guard JROTC unit 
for a total of 3,229 units.3 These programs are active in all 50 states and some overseas 
locations. However, due to the war in Iraq, many of the programs have come under 
scrutiny and controversy has erupted in the last five years about JROTC programs in 
schools. Both the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) and Central Committee 
                                                 
2 Cornell Law School,”U.S. Code Collection”, January 2006, 
<http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode10/usc_sec_10_00002031----000-.html>. 
3 “JROTC Universe” January 2007, < http://www.geocities.com/pentagon/bunker/5841/Units.html >. 
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for Conscientious Objectors (CCCO) argue that the JROTC programs are a military 
recruiting tool and distract students from concentrating on their education and instill 
violence in its members. In November, 2006 the San Francisco School Board voted to 
disband all JROTC program in the city. The board argued that "armed forces should have 
no place in public schools, and the military's discriminatory stance on gays makes the 
presence of JROTC unacceptable.”4  
In FY2005 the DOD budgeted $243 million for the JROTC program and increased 
that amount to $272 million in FY2007 to help supplement the costs of state schools in 
providing this program to its students.5 To date, there is little evidence to support any of 
these policy actions, whether they involve removing JROTC from schools or increasing 
its funding  
C. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
This thesis will analyze the effects the Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps 
(JROTC) program on sailors in their first term of enlistment. The outcomes that will be 
analyzed include attrition, promotion, and reenlistment. The data used for this analysis 
was obtained from the Navy’s Active Duty Military Master and Loss Edit 
Documentation, created by the Defense Manpower Data Center. The file provides 
information on all personnel who enlisted in the Navy from 1994 - 2002. Using this data, 
I will perform different estimations to predict first term attrition, promotion during the 
first term, and reenlistment at the end of the term as a function of demographic, other 
background characteristics, and participation in JROTC or other similar youth programs. 
The focus of the study, therefore, will be the additional effect of JROTC participation on 
the performance of sailors, holding constant everything else.  For promotion models, the 
focus will be on the promotion to Petty Officer Third Class (E4) and Petty Officer 
Second Class (E5). For the attrition models, I will focus on first term attrition only. 
Finally, I will determine if JROTC has any effects on reenlistment in the Navy. This 
thesis attempts to answer several questions:  
                                                 
4 “A School Board War on JROTC” San Francisco Chronicle, 13 November 2006, January 2007, 
<http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2006/11/15/BAG2HMD46B1.DTL>. 
5 Secretary of Defense, “O&M review of FY2007 Armed Forces Budget Estimates”, February 2006, 
January 2007, http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2007/fy2007_overview.pdf. 
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1. What effect does participation in JROTC have on first term attrition rates?  
2. What effect does participation in JROTC have on first term promotion rates to 
grades E4 and E5?  
3. What effect does participation in JROTC have on first term reenlistment rates? 
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY  
Chapter II provides a review of various studies that have analyzed attrition, 
promotion, and reenlistment. The studies are used to develop the models of how 
participation in JROTC affects the career of Navy enlistees. Chapter III discusses the 
empirical models traditionally employed to explore military manpower issues to include 
reenlistment decisions and attrition. Chapter III also discusses the data used in this study, 
obtained from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). In Chapter V the empirical 
results and findings are presented. Finally, Chapter VI presents concluding remarks and a 






















II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 JROTC students are introduced to the military way of life and its ideologies 
during high school. Although the JROTC program does not set recruitments as its 
primary goal, it does provide hands-on information about the military way of life and 
what to expect if one joins the military. A study conducted by the Denver public schools 
Office of Program Evaluation, found that JROTC graduates were as much as five times 
more likely to enlist than non-participants.6 However, the study suggested that these 
students could be interested in the military early on, and joined the JROTC program in 
order to obtain a head start on the military career. Annual enlistees who are JROTC 
students increased from 1994-1998 (1,349 enlistees in 1998) and have since dropped to 
just under 992 in FY02, which was an all time low for the last nine years. One hypothesis 
is that this training in high school prepares JROTC students for success in the armed 
forces. The literature review that follows will summarize results from previous studies 
that have looked at attrition, promotion, and reenlistment in the military of enlistees with 
JROTC backgrounds.  
1. Attrition 
One hypothesis is that attrition rates of JROTC participants would be lower then 
non-participants, because participants are better informed about their choice to enlist. 
Empirically, it is important to test whether this difference exists and whether it is 
significant. In addition, it is important to evaluate its magnitude in order to determine 
whether the cost of JROTC outweighs the benefits it provides to the Navy.  
In a master’s thesis, Days and Ang of the Naval Postgraduate School used data 
from the Defense Manpower Data Center on all enlisted cohorts who entered the Armed 
Forces between 1980 and 2000 to study the performance of JROTC participants. The 
overall population for the study contains 2,270,089 recruits who where tracked 
longitudinally. In this database, 85,120 recruits had participated in the JROTC Program, 
                                                 
6 Office of Program Evaluation. “JROTC Program Evaluation” 1996. p 3. 
6 
or roughly 3.7%.7 As for first term attrition, generally one third of recruits attrite in their 
first term.8 The military devotes substantial resources to reduce this attrition but has 
made little head way over the past 5 years. Days found that JROTC participants attrite at 
lower rates (3% lower then non-participants over 12 years).9  In a comprehensive study 
conducted by Professors from the Naval Postgraduate School on JROTC found that 
minority groups (defined as black, Hispanics, and other race) that had participated in 
JROTC had much lower attrition rates then their white counterparts who also participated 
in JROTC. For black and Hispanic recruits the average attrition rate was 4% lower and 
for the ‘other race’ minority group it was lower by an average of 5%.10 The study also 
presents a basic cost benefit analysis, estimating that it costs an average of $11,000 to 
recruit a military member and $35,000 to initially train them for a total cost of $46,000.11 
The study assumes that it costs less to recruit a JROTC Graduate ($5,000) and they attrite 
at a 3% lower rate so the government saves more then $9,000,000 annually.12 
In another study, Lieutenant Days uses a Cox Proportional hazard model to 
analyze the attrition of naval recruits in both their first year and the first four years in 
service. Using DMDC data (FY1980-FY2000), she focused on Navy recruits in their first 
4 years of service. The data set contained 529,971 observations.13 With respect to 1st 
year attrition, she found that participation in JROTC did not affect attrition rates 
significantly. However, when focusing on black JROTC students, she found that they 
were significantly more likely to complete the first year compared to other JROTC 
participants.14 Other variables that where found to decrease first year attrition were 
                                                 
7 Days and Ang, “An Empirical Examination of the Impact of JROTC Participation on Enlistment, 
Retention, and Attrition. Naval Postgraduate School, December 2004. p 72. 
8.Ibid p 72. 
9 Ibid p 74. 
10 Graduate School of Business and Public Policy. “A Comprehensive Study of the JROTC Program” 
Naval Postgraduate School. January 2002. p 77. 
11 Ibid p 86. 
12 Ibid p 86. 
13 Janet Days, “Directed Study of NJROTC” Naval Postgraduate School. 21 March 2005. p 6. 
14 Ibid p 14. 
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higher pay-grades at entry, prior service, being a minority, and high AFQT scores.15 In 
the four year attrition model Days found that participation in JROTC increased the 
chances of completing four years of service in the Navy by 5 percentage points (the 
effect, however, was only significant at the 10% level).1617 Other variables that 
significantly decreased first term attrition were found to be minority status, being married 
with dependents, prior service, and having high AFQT scores.18 
In a NPS Masters thesis Arias and Dal looked at attrition of Hispanics in the 
military. Although their analysis did not focus on JROTC participation, and they looked 
at all four services, some of their results will be useful when comparing attrition rates for 
naval personnel. They also used a data base supplied by DMDC that contained all armed 
forces personnel that entered the military from FY1992-FY2005. The data was updated 
each year for each enlistee (3,798,617 total enlistees) to reflect the changes in their 
military careers throughout the years.19  In their analysis of attrition they utilized a 
multivariate probit model to estimate the probability of attrition in the first six months 
and at four years of service. They found that minorities (blacks, Hispanics, and Asians) 
had lower attrition rates in the first six months than whites.20 They also found that 
recruits who enter at a higher pay grade attrite at much lower rates, probably due to 
perceived better career prospects.21 This may be one reason JROTC gradates could have 
a lower attrition rate, because most enter the military at E2 and E3. For the four year 
attrition results, Arias and Dal found similar results.22     
2.  Promotion 
Compared to attrition, there are relatively few studies of promotion. This may in 
part be due to the fact that the hierarchical structure within the military is rigid and path-
                                                 
15 Janet Days, “Directed Study of NJROTC” Naval Postgraduate School. 21 March 2005. p 14. 
16 Ibid p 16. 
17 Ibid p 16. 
18 Ibid p 17. 
19 Arias and Dal, “Hispanics in the U.S. Military” Naval Postgraduate School. September 2006. p 45. 
20 Ibid. p 71. 
21 Ibid. p 75. 
22 Ibid. p 74. 
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dependent. Nevertheless, it is important from a personnel viewpoint to analyze how 
recruits advance through the ranks. Buddin (2002) developed a model to look at first term 
reenlistment and promotion. The model incorporated the likelihood of a recruit in the 
Army to attain the rank of E5 in his first term of service. In the model, the dependent 
variable was defined as the expected amount of time it takes for each solder to attain the 
rank of E5. Control variables included, among other things, race, gender, military 
occupational specialties (MOSs), AFQT Scores, and educational background.23 The 
study finds that blacks, older recruits, those who have completed some college credits, 
and those with higher AFQT scores had higher probabilities of promotion.24 On the other 
hand, being female or Asian, and having obtained a GED instead of a high school 
diploma had a negative effect on promotion.25  
Arias and Dal also looked at promotion to the pay grade of E4. In the probit 
model (very similar to the one for attrition) they found that being a minority, female, 
having higher AFQT scores, and entering the service at a higher pay grade have positive 
effects on the promotion probability of Naval recruits.26 The variables that decreased the 
chances of promotion were having more dependents and lower AFQT scores.27 Based on 
the literature, my promotion models will control for the effects of race, gender and AFQT 
scores. Unfortunately, there are no studies that focus on the effect of JROTC or other 
similar youth programs on military promotions, so it will be very interesting to determine 
how JROTC graduates fare in promotion to E4 and E5 in the Navy. 
3.  Reenlistment 
Reenlistment is an important goal in the Navy today, especially given the recent 
technological advances. This study investigates whether participation in the Junior 
Reserve Offices Training Corps (JROTC) program reduces attrition in the first-term, 
increases the chances of promotion, and influences reenlistment. This analysis makes use 
                                                 
23 Richard Buddin, “Success of First-Term Soldiers: The Effects of Recruiting Practices and Recruit  
Characteristics,” The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, March 2002. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Arias and Dal, “Hispanics in the U.S. Military” Naval Postgraduate School. September 2006. p 83. 
27 Ibid. p 83-84. 
9 
of multivariate models to estimate the causal effect of JROTC participation on attrition, 
promotion and reenlistment. 
I utilized data from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) enlisted 
personnel cohort files from Fiscal Year (FY) 1994 to 2002. Using econometric analysis, I 
find that participation in JROTC reduces attrition and increases the probability of 
reenlistment, but also reduces the chance of promotion. This latter result is in part due to 
the hierarchical structure of the organization, which limits the number of promotions 
combined with the fact that JROTC enlistees tend to enter at higher grades. My results 
also show that females that participate in JROTC reenlist at higher rates then both males 
and females that participate in no youth programs. These findings are relevant to policy-
makers when determining the future of the JROTC program. By investing early in this 
program, the Navy could provide substantial cost savings in the form of recruiting and 
training costs. I would recommend that a cost benefit analysis study be conducted to 
determine if money spent on the JROTC program is money well spent. 
development of state of the art weapons systems. The Navy now has a greater need to 
“age” its force in order to keep well-trained sailors and reduce the costs of training new 
ones. Numerous studies have looked at military reenlistment and the identifiable 
characteristics of recruits to ensure that the costs of training can be recouped or 
minimized via re-enlistments. There have been three basic studies that have looked at 
variables that affect individuals’ reenlistment decisions. The first looks at the effects of 
pay, selective reenlistment bonuses (SRB)/incentive pays, pay grade, and marriage on a 
military members’ decisions to reenlist and remain in the armed forces. The second group 
of studies looks at aptitude test scores, race, gender, and educational background of 
recruits prior to entering the armed forces. The third and last group of studies analyzes 
the effects of youth programs (e.g, JROTC) on an individual’s career decisions in and out 
of the armed forces.  
Quester and Adedeji (1991) analyzed the effect of bonuses, pay grades, marriage, 
and the number of dependents for Marine Corp members on their decision to reenlist.28 
The population sample was restricted to marines who were eligible and recommended for 
                                                 
28 Quester and Adedeji, Reenlisting in the Marine Corps: The Impact of Bonuses, Grade, and 
Dependency Status,” C.N.A. Corporation, Alexandria, VA, July1991. 
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retention. The results indicate that those with higher pay grades and those who receive 
Selective Reenlistment Bonuses (SRB) had higher reenlistment rates.29 It was also 
determined that minorities, females, and married marines were more likely to reenlist.30 
The study also determined that, when the ratio of military pay to civilian pay is higher, 
and when the unemployment rate is higher, reenlistments increase.31 Warner and Asch 
(1995) came to the same conclusion while analyzing the effects of the Annualized Cost of 
Leaving (ACOL) on reenlistment decisions.32 Similarly, Mackin and Darling (1996) 
found comparable results while analyzing the impact of incentive pay on officer 
retention.33  
Cooke and Quester (1992) analyzed the effect of background characteristics on 
the attrition rates of naval personnel. They discovered that high school graduates with 
high AFQT scores and those who entered through Delayed Entry Program (DEP) where 
more likely to complete their first term of service and to reenlist.34 They also found that 
Black and Hispanic recruits promoted and reenlisted at higher rates.35 Although this 
study focused on male recruits, its findings are similar to others that indicate that race and 
education predict how military members make decisions on reenlistment.  
Days and Ang (2004) analyzed the military enlistment rates of JROTC students as 
well as retention and attrition of JROTC participants who enlist. The sample was drawn 
from the Department of education (High School and Beyond study) and was made up of 
all personnel that enlisted in the armed forces from FY1980-FY2000.36 In this study 
                                                 
29 Quester and Adedeji, Reenlisting in the Marine Corps: The Impact of Bonuses, Grade, and 
Dependency Status,” C.N.A. Corporation, Alexandria, VA, July1991. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid 
32 Warner and Asch, “The Economics of Military Manpower,” Handbook of Defense Economics, Vol 
I, Elsevier Science, BV, 1995. 
33 Mackin and Darling, “Economic Analysis of Proposed Surface Warfare Officer Career Incentive 
Pay”, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington, DC, September 1996. 
34 Cooke and Quester, “The Characteristics of Successful Enlistees in the All-Volunteer Force; A 
Study of Male Recruits in the US Navy”, Social Science Quarterly, Vol 73, Number 2, June 1992.   
35 Cooke and Quester, “The Characteristics of Successful Enlistees in the All-Volunteer Force; A 
Study of Male Recruits in the US Navy”, Social Science Quarterly, Vol 73, Number 2, June 1992.   
36 Days and Ang, “An Empirical Examination of the Impact of JROTC Participation on Enlistment, 
Retention, and Attrition. Naval Postgraduate School, December 2004. 
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JROTC participants are compared to non-JROTC participants. They found that 
participation in JROTC had a positive effect on reenlistment. In particular, they report 
that JROTC participants reenlist at a 3.5% greater rate then non-JROTC personnel.37 
However, given that only 3.09% of the personnel that reenlisted had participated in 
JROTC, the authors expressed doubt as to the overall cost-savings provided by the 
JROTC program.38  
Although this study focuses on the military performance of JROTC participants, 
the program itself has many goals, most of which involve improving students’ 
educational outcomes. Bailey, Hodak, Sheppard, and Hassen (1992) surveyed 38 
NJROTC units (out of 300) and found that participation in the NJROTC program reduces 
the drop out rate of high school students who participated in the program.39 The study 
also noted that the NJROTC program positively affected the student’s decisions to stay in 
school and graduate.40 With respect to enlistment intentions, the authors report that 20% 
of the surveyed students planed to join the military after high school, whereas 60% 
planed to attend college.41 It must be pointed out that the study was limited to 
comparisons of means between participants and non-participants, and did not employ an 
empirical analysis to establish whether these differences were statistically significant or 
causal.    
B. CONCLUSION  
 This section reviews findings of various studies on attrition, promotion, and 
reenlistment. While pinpointing demographic characteristics that affect these measures of 
performance, the literature also provides limited evidence on the effect of JROTC on 
military enlistments, and performance in the military. In particular, no studies have 
looked at career progression in the way of military promotion and the rate of promotion 
for JROTC personnel. In addition, whether the effect of JROTC varies by gender, has 
                                                 
37 Days and Ang, “An Empirical Examination of the Impact of JROTC Participation on Enlistment, 
Retention, and Attrition. Naval Postgraduate School, December 2004. 
38 Ibid 
39 Bailey, Hodak, Sheppard, and Hassen, Technical Report 92-015, “Benefits Analysis of the Naval 




also escaped academic scrutiny. The following chapters introduce and describe the data, 
and present the empirical findings. In addition, the results are compared to the studies 























III.  DATA DESCRIPTION 
A. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter describes the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) enlisted 
personnel cohort data that will be used to determine the impact of JROTC participation 
on first term attrition, promotion, and reenlistment of U.S. Navy recruits. Three basic 
groups will be identified: recruits that participated in the JROTC program for 3 or 4 
years; recruits that participated in other youth programs; and recruits that participated in 
no youth programs. I have already discussed the JROTC program in detail so the rest of 
the discussion will provide information on other youth programs that high school students 
participate in and could have similar effects as JROTC. These programs consist of senior 
ROTC, Civil Air Patrol, and Sea Cadet.  
The first program, ROTC, is a college-based program that is used as an officer 
recruitment tool. The ROTC program provides tuition funding for students who cannot 
afford to pay for college. In exchange for this funding students must enter the armed 
forces for a minimum of 4 years. Most will enter the armed forces as officers. However, 
those who do not graduate from college or who do not complete the ROTC program may 
enter as enlisted personnel. The program is designed to focus on leadership development, 
problem solving, ethics and preparing the students for serving as officers in the armed 
forces. Given its similarity to the JROTC program, the analysis will separate ROTC 
participants from both JROTC-participant and non-participant groups.   
The second program, Civil Air Patrol, is an Air Force program to help develop 
leadership skills and educate youths between the ages of 12-18 in the fundamentals of 
aerospace science. This program teaches core values similar to JROTC. However, unlike 
JROTC it is an after-school program and students that participate only receive 
community service hours. Students that have participated in Civil Air Patrol usually make 
up around 10% of the freshman class at the Air Force Academy, but there is no 
information on how many join the military as enlisted personnel.42  
                                                 
42 “Civil Air Patrol” January 2007. http://www.cap.gov/visitors/quick_info/for_students.cfm. 
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Finally, the Naval Sea Cadet Corps (NSCC) is a youth program for ages 13-17 
who are interested in learning about the Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard and Merchant 
Marine. These programs introduce students to the navy way of life. They also develop a 
sense of pride, patriotism, and how to live in an environment free of drugs and gangs. 
This program is very similar to the Civil Air Patrol and only meets after school or on 
weekends. Students who participate in this program are also eligible to enter the armed 
forces at higher pay grades (E2 and E3) under certain circumstances. In the analysis that 
follows, students participating in any of the three programs described above will be 
grouped and analyzed separately from JROTC students.  
B. DMDC COHORT DATA  
The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) supplied the data for this study, 
which consist of Navy enlisted cohort files. Each cohort of naval recruits is identified by 
the fiscal year (FY) they entered the Navy. The cohorts obtained include enlisted 
personnel who entered the Navy from FY 1994 to FY 2002.43 These cohort files were 
matched with corresponding active duty inventory files at 7-year intervals in order to 
track changes in several variables, such as pay grade, marriage, number of dependents, 
education levels, and rank to name a few. 
C.  VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS 
1.  Dependent Variables. 
I will focus on three dependent variables: attrition, promotion, and reenlistment. 
While prior attrition studies distinguish between early attrition (first six months) and first 
term attrition (first four years), here I will analyze attrition in the first year and overall 
first term attrition rate. Promotion is defined as promotion to E4 or E5 by year 4 (prior to 
the reenlistment decision). Chapter IV will discuss each specific model and reasons for 
excluding certain variables from some models and restricting the sample for part of the 
analysis. Table 1 summarizes the dependent variables and their definitions. 
 
                                                  
43 The original data set covers 1994-2005. However, those enlisting after 2002 would not be in the 
sample long enough to observe re-enlistment decisions. In addition, after 2002, the Race/Ethnic variable 
was replaced with another variable consisting of self-reported ethnicity categories. Since this study will 
consider JROTC effects by race, it was deemed more appropriate to use consistent definitions of this 
variable. Therefore, the data summary and analysis will only focus on the 1994-2002 period. 
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Table 1.   Dependent Variable Descriptions 
 
VARIABLE DEFINITION 
Dependent Variables  
Attrite year 1 =1 if a recruits attrite in year 1; else 0 
Attrite year 2 =1 if a recruits attrite in year 2; else 0 (all year 1 recruits that 
attrite are excluded) 
Attrite year 3 =1 if a recruits attrite in year 3; else 0 (all year 1 and 2 recruits 
that attrite are excluded) 
Attrite year 4 =1 if a recruits attrite in year 4; else 0 (all year 1, 2 and 3 
recruits that attrite are excluded) 
Attrition overall =1 if a recruits attrite in the first term; else 0 (no exclusions) 
Promotion to E4 or E5 at 
the end of first-term 
=1 if a recruit promotes to E4 or E5 in first-term; else 0 (those 
who attrite in the first 4 years were excluded) 
Reenlist  =1 if a recruit reenlisted at the end of his contract; else 0 (all 
first-term recruits that  attrite are excluded) 
 
2.  Independent Variables. 
Independent variables include demographics (gender, race, marriage, number of 
dependents) and other background characteristics, such as pay grades, education level, 
mental group (CAT’s), and an indicator for participation in youth programs. As a 
reminder, gender, education, pay grade, and marital status could not be determined for 
individuals who attrite in year 1, due to recording practices. The race categories were 
created by combining information from “Race/Ethnic” and “Ethnic” variables. In 
particular, I separated Hispanics into sub-categories based on their country of origin. The 
pay grade variable denotes the rank a recruit attained in each specific fiscal year. The 
marriage variable indicates if a recruit was married in the year of his enlistment. Table 2 
summarizes the variable definitions and their coding. 




Male =1 if a recruit is a male; else 0 
Female  =1 if a recruit is a female; else 0 
Race/Ethnic   
White =1 if a recruit is a white; else 0 
Black =1 if a recruit is a black; else 0 
Mexican =1 if a recruit is a other Mexican; else 0 
Puerto Rican =1 if a recruit is a other Puerto Rican; else 0 
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Cuban =1 if a recruit is a other Cuban; else 0 
Latin American =1 if a recruit is a other Latin American; else 0 
Other Hispanic descent =1 if a recruit is a other Hispanic descent; else 0 
Native =1 if a recruit is a native American/pacific islander; else 0 
Asian =1 if a recruit is a Asian; else 0 
Other =1 if a recruit is a other; else 0 
Pay grade  
E1 year 1 =1 if a recruit was a E1 in year 1; else 0 
E2 year 1 =1 if a recruit was a E2 in year 1; else 0 
E3 year 1 =1 if a recruit was a E3 in year 1; else 0 
E4 year 1 =1 if a recruit was a E4 in year 1; else 0 
E1 (used in Promotion 
Model) 
=1 if a recruit was a E1 in the designated year; else 0 
E2 (used in Promotion 
Model) 
=2 if a recruit was a E2 in the designated year; else 0 
E3 (used in Promotion 
Model) 
=3 if a recruit was a E3 in the designated year; else 0 
E4 (used in Promotion 
Model) 
=4 if a recruit was a E4 in the designated year; else 0 
E5 (used in Promotion 
Model) 
=5 if a recruit was a E5 in the designated year; else 0 
Education  
No high school degree =1 if a recruit entered the Navy with no high school degree; 
else 0 
High school degree =1 if a recruit entered the Navy with a high school degree; 
else 0 
Some college =1 If a recruit had attained college credit prior to entering the 
Navy, but not college degree; else 0 
College degree =1 if a recruit entered the Navy with a college degree or 
higher; else 0 
Mental group  
CAT Missing =1 if a recruit has no score on AFQT; else 0 
CAT I =1 if a recruits scores between 93rd and 99th Percentile on the 
AFQT; else 0  
CAT II =1 if a recruits scores between 65th and 92nd Percentile on the 
AFQT; else 0 
CAT IIIA =1 if a recruits scores between 50th and 64th Percentile on the 
AFQT; else 0 
CAT IIIB =1 if a recruits scores between 31st and 49th Percentile on the 
AFQT; else 0 
Personnel Data  
Marriage  =1 if Married; else 0 
Dependents = the number of dependents listed for each specific year of a 
recruits career 
Youth Programs  
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No youth program =1 if a recruit had participated in no youth program; else 0 
Other youth program =1 if a recruited participated in a youth program other then 
JROTC; else 0 
JROTC =1 if a recruit participated and completed 3 or 4 years in a 
JROTC program; else 0  
 
D.  DATA SAMPLES AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 The key variable in the dataset is the “Youth Program” variable, which allows 
identification of recruits who participated in JROTC or other youth programs (Civil Air 
Patrol, Sea Cadet, ROTC) prior to enlisting. It should be noted that this variable classifies 
a recruit as a JROTC-participant if he/she participated in the program for three or more 
years. Participation in other youth programs (Civil Air Patrol, Sea Cadet, and ROTC) was 
combined into one dummy variable named ‘other youth programs’. While the focus of 
this study is the performance of JROTC participants as compared to non-participants, 
enlistees who participated in other youth programs, will also be considered. I exclude 
from the data all prior service personnel, because their decisions to come back in the 
Navy or transfer into the Navy from another service, may bias the estimates.  
The following tables provides descriptive statistics for the three identified groups: 
recruits that participated in JROTC, those who participated in other youth programs, and 
finally recruits with no prior exposure to the military or any of the above programs. Table 
3 summarizes the total number of recruits that participated in JROTC, Other Youth 
Programs, and No Youth Programs for each fiscal year (entry cohort). 
Table 3.   Recruit Participation numbers 
 





Cohort 94 1,097 446 34,888 36,431 
Cohort 95 1,122 403 36,139 37,664 
Cohort 96 1,136 469 39,219 40,824 
Cohort 97 1,342 534 44,294 46,170 
Cohort 98 1,349 504 43,107 44,960 
Cohort 99 1,278 476 49,459 51,213 
Cohort 00 1,185 303 49,809 51,297 
Cohort 01 1,109 325 50,201 51,635 
Cohort 02 992 287 43,435 44,714 
TOTAL 10,610 3,747 390,551 404,908 
Source: Derived from Defense Manpower Data Center Cohort Files  
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It is interesting to note that the number of recruits that have participated in 
JROTC and Other Youth Programs has declined starting with cohort FY99, while the 
total number of recruits has increased (at least until FY2002). Overall, the recruits that 
participate in JROTC represent 2.62% of all recruits that entered the Navy between 1994 
and 2002. Recruits that participate in other youth programs represent only 0.93% of total 
enlistments for this period.  
Next, I compare the main demographic and other characteristics of recruits for the 
three groups I defined above. First, I focus on the gender composition, which can be 
derived from the SEX variable in the DMDC files. However, since this variable is only 
coded at the end of the first year, I am only able to determine the gender of recruits who 
complete their first year of service. Table 4 presents the gender distribution across all 
three participant groups, by cohort. It appears that the percentage of female JROTC 
participants that enlist is slightly higher than the proportion of females that enlist in the 
other two groups (by about 4%).  
Table 4.   Recruit Distributions by Gender by Youth Programs 
 
GENDER JROTC Other Youth 
Programs 
No Youth Programs 
Male 68.28% 71.91% 70.46% 
Female 18.67% 14.12% 13.94% 
Unknown 13.03% 13.96% 15.60% 
Source: Derived from Defense Manpower Data Center Cohort Data Files  
 Next, I explore the race and ethnic distribution of the sample. Table 5 shows the 
minority representation for all recruits that entered the Navy from FY94 – FY02. Table 5 
indicates that about half of JROTC participants that entered the Navy in the past nine 
years are minorities. This could be due to the fact that JROTC units are usually hosted by 
schools located in urban areas with relatively high minority enrollments. Table 3 shows 
that minorities make up a little less then 50% of the recruits that participated in JROTC 
and joined the Navy compared to 37% of recruits that do not participate in any youth 
programs. According to Ang and Days (2004) the JROTC participation rate for Blacks 
and Hispanics steadily increased up until FY00. 
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Table 5.   Recruit Distribution by Race and Ethnicity by Youth Programs  
 
RACE/ETHNICITY JROTC Other Youth 
Program 
No Youth Program 
White 50.74% 58.01% 62.68% 
Black 36.02% 24.55% 18.47% 
Mexican 3.36% 3.56% 4.19% 
Puerto Rican .92% 1.84% 1.25% 
Cuban .09% .13% .17% 
Latin American .34% .50% .78% 
Other Hispanic 3.05% 3.42% 4.37% 
Native American/ 
Pacific Islander 
1.65% 2.46% 2.74% 
Asian 2.94% 4.84% 4.42% 
Other .89% .67% .90% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Derived from Defense Manpower Data Center Cohort Files  
Table 6 shows the education level, Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) 
percentile score, and test category (CAT) of the recruits who entered the Navy. The 
education categories include: no high school degree/GED, high school graduate, some 
college, those with a college degree, and no education information (since education level 
is missing for a large number of recruits) The AFQT is a military aptitude test that helps 
recruiters place recruits into jobs they are qualified for and have the aptitude to complete 
the required training successfully. The score on the AFQT is used to place the individual 
into four basic categories (CAT). In CAT I are individuals who score in the 93rd-99th 
percentile, CAT II score between the 65th-92nd, those in CAT IIIA score between 50th and 
64th, and those in CAT IIIB score between 31st and 49th. Most individuals that score 
lower then CAT IIIB are not permitted to join the military without a waiver. Table 6 
shows that JROTC recruits are more likely to be high school graduates as opposed to the 
‘other youth programs’ and ‘no youth programs’ groups, which both display a higher 
proportion of GED-holders and high school dropouts. However, JROTC recruits score 
lower then the other two groups on the AFQT.  
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JROTC Other Youth 
Programs 
No Youth Programs 
Non High school 
Grad/GED 
5.87% 8.93% 9.20% 
High School Grad 87.21% 82.24% 82.27% 
Some College 1.33% 1.97% 2.36% 
College Degree .77% 1.87% 2.12% 
No Education Info 4.82% 4.98% 3.32% 
CAT Missing .78% 1.44% 2.18% 
CAT IIIB 37.59% 32.60% 30.91% 
CAT IIIA 26.77% 25.38% 25.63% 
CAT II 31.49% 34.82% 36.14% 
CAT I 3.37% 5.75% 5.14% 
AFQT (AVG score) 57.55% 60.74% 61.14% 
Source: Derived from Defense Manpower Data Center Cohort Files  
 Table 7 breaks down the rank at which the recruits enter the Navy. As discussed 
in Chapter I, most JROTC graduates enter the military at higher pay grades due to their 
training and experience. In fact, Table 5 shows that most JROTC recruits enter at the pay 
grade of E3. As discussed earlier, the other youth programs also enable recruits to enter 
the Navy at higher pay grades and that is why we see more enlistees at E3 for this group 
compared to the ‘no youth program’ recruits. For a recruit who has not participated in any 
military youth programs, he/she can only enter the Navy at a higher pay grade by 
referring friends to the Navy recruiter, by completing some college credits, or attaining a 
college degree prior to enlisting. As discussed in the literature review, pay grade has been 
shown to have a negative effect on attrition and a positive effect on retention. The models 
estimated below will analyze such effects.  
Table 7.   Distribution of Entry Rank by Youth Programs 
 
Pay Grade in Year 1 JROTC Other Youth 
Programs 
No Youth Programs 
E1 7.56% 15.94% 40.30% 
E2 16.23% 39.04% 33.07% 
E3 72.77% 40.09% 20.09% 
E4 3.17% 4.45% 5.19% 
Source: Derived from Defense Manpower Data Center Cohort Files  
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 Table 8 summarizes the performance of recruits (attrition, reenlistment, 
promotion) based on their background characteristics and program participation. The 
one-year and first-term attrition columns shows that recruits who participate in JROTC 
have attrition rates that are about 3% less for one-year and 4% less for the first-term of 
service when compared to recruits who do not participate in any youth programs. Whites 
attrite at higher rates then all the other minorities except for native Americans/pacific 
islanders. In addition, recruits with higher AFQT scores have lower attrition rates. The 
promotion column shows that JROTC recruits, males, Asians, recruits with college 
degrees, and those with higher AFQT scores promote at higher rates. With respect to 
reenlistments, JROTC recruits, males, Asians, and recruits with some college credits 
reenlist at higher rates.  We also see that the higher the entry pay-grade the better chance 
of promoting to E4 or E5 and reenlisting. It should be noted that promotion and 
reenlistment results are calculated only for those who did not attrite during the first-term. 
However, this table doesn’t indicate if these differences in performance are statistically 
significant. For that we will turn to multivariate models.       







E4 or E5 
Reenlistment 
JROTC 14.15% 35.39% 66.45% 67.04% 
Other Youth 
Program 
15.36% 37.42% 65.64% 65.32% 
No Youth 
Program 
17.36% 39.59% 65.17% 62.47% 
Male   66.22% 62.77% 
Female   60.27% 61.89% 
White 18.53% 41.34% 67.75% 60.46% 
Black 16.33% 39.93% 55.23% 66.85% 
Hispanic 13.88% 33.03% 65.28% 61.91% 
Mexican 12.94% 30.86% 66.04% 60.20% 
Puerto Rican 16.28% 35.83% 63.69% 67.10% 
Cuban 15.50% 38.29% 60.25% 57.29% 
Latin American 12.18% 30.53% 65.53% 64.70% 





19.78% 43.76% 66.73% 66.15% 
Asian 10.31% 24.55% 71.75% 71.25% 




  57.79% 61.85% 
High School 
Grad 
  66.39% 63.05% 
Some College   55.87% 62.60% 
College Degree   77.65% 62.30% 
No Education 
Info 
  54.77% 54.73% 
CAT Missing 38.14% 63.36% 65.31% 65.95% 
CAT IIIB 18.64% 41.73% 54.37% 58.65% 
CAT IIIA 18.83% 41.50% 62.62% 59.43% 
CAT II 15.47% 36.69% 73.91% 66.17% 
CAT I 12.11% 33.18% 79.18% 74.37% 
E1   55.08% 56.23% 
E2   69.29% 63.73% 
E3   77.23 70.55 
E4   83.48 83.92 
Sample Rate 17.26% 39.45% 65.21% 62.62% 











IV.  METHODOLOGY 
A.  INTRODUCTION  
I developed three basic models to measure the effects of participation in the 
JROTC program on attrition, promotion during the first term, and on reenlistment. For 
each of the three outcomes I estimate a baseline model by excluding the JROTC and 
other youth program variables. I then estimate the same models including the variables 
for JROTC, other youth programs, and no youth programs (which is the control group). 
Finally, I break down the Hispanic group into ethnic categories (Mexican, Puerto Rican, 
Cuban, Latin American, and other Hispanic descent). Below I describe each basic model 
and the reasons for including or excluding independent variables.  
1.  Models for First Year Attrition and First-Term Attrition 
The models were specified based on prior attrition studies. However, due to the 
coding of the DMDC data, I am unable to determine gender, education, pay grade, and 
married for those who attrite in the first year. I have also decided to exclude all prior 
service personnel because I believe they may bias my results due to their decision to re-
enter the Navy. The model for attrition (first year/first term) is specified as follows:  
Pr(Attrition Yr1 and First-term) =  ß0 + ß1 (CAT missing) + ß2 (CAT I) + ß3 
(CAT II) + ß4 (CAT IIIB) + ß5 (Black) +ß6 (Mexican) ß7 (Puerto Rican) + ß8 (Cuban) + 
ß9 (Latin American) + ß10 (Other Hispanic) + ß11 (Native) + ß12 (Asian) + ß13 (Other) 
+ ß14 (JROTC) + ß15 (Other youth programs) +ei  
 
The category with the majority of observations in each variable group was 
selected as the base case. For this model the base case is: Cat IIIA, white, and no youth 
program.  
2.  Model of Promotion to E4 or E5 in the First-term 
The promotion models are similar to the ones discussed in the literature review 
with the exception that I define promotion as achieving the rank of E4 or E5 during the 
first term. The score a recruit achieves on his rating exam coupled with his evaluations 
and time-in-grade will determine if he is promoted to the next pay grade. See Table 9 
below for pay grade distributions achieved by year 4 in the data. 
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Table 9.   Pay grade distribution by fourth year. 
 
Pay Grade % at year 4 




 Source: Derived from Defense Manpower Data Center Cohort Files  
The promotion model also excludes prior service for the reasons discussed above. 
I have also excluded from the sample recruits who enter the Navy under a five or six year 
contract. Because these recruits are promoted to E4 upon completion of “A” school they 
may bias my promotion model if they were included. I also included variables for entry 
pay grades of each recruit. These variables will allow me to determine if recruits who 
enter at higher pay grades promote faster.  The model for Promotion to E4 or E5 is 
specified as follows: 
Pr(Promotion to E4 or E5 in Year 4) = ß0 + ß1 (No education info) + ß2 (Non-
high school graduate) + ß3 (Some college) + ß4 (College degree) +ß5 (Married (in year 
of attrition)) + ß6 (CAT missing) + ß7 (CAT I) + ß8 (CAT II) + ß9 (CAT IIIB) + ß10 
(Female) + ß11 (Black) + ß12 (Mexican) + ß13 (Puerto Rican) + ß14 (Cuban) + ß15 
(Latin American) + ß16 (Other Hispanic) + ß17 (Native) + ß18 (Asian) + ß19 (Other) + 
ß20 (JROTC) + ß21 (Other youth programs) + ß22 (E01) + ß23 (E03) + ß24 (E04) + ei  
 
The category with the majority of observations in each variable group was 
selected as the base case. The base case for the promotion model is: high school graduate, 
not married, CAT IIIA, white, no youth program, entry pay grade of E02. 
3. Reenlistment Models 
 This model specification is based on the models discussed in the literature review. 
However, I exclude all those who attrite during the first four years, because if a person is 
not eligible to promote due to attrition they could bias the model estimates. The model 
will also exclude prior service for the same reason and will control for marital status 
during the fourth year. The model for reenlistment is specified as follows: 
Pr(Reenlistment at the end of the first-term) = ß0 + ß1 (No education info) + ß2 
(Non-high school graduate) + ß3 (Some college) + ß4 (College degree) +ß5 (Married (in 
year of attrition)) + ß6 (CAT missing) + ß7 (CAT I) + ß8 (CAT II) + ß9 (CAT IIIB) + 
ß10 (Female) + ß11 (Black) + ß12 (Mexican) + ß13 (Puerto Rican) + ß14 (Cuban) + ß15 
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(Latin American) + ß16 (Other Hispanic) + ß17 (Native) + ß18 (Asian) + ß19 (Other) + 
ß20 (JROTC) + ß21 (Other youth programs) +ei  
 
The category with the majority of observations in each variable group was 
selected as the base case for purposes of estimating the partial effects. The base case for 
this model is: high school graduate, not married, CAT IIIA, white, and no youth program. 
B.  HYPOTHESIZED EFFECTS OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES  
Recruits who participate in JROTC are expected to have lower rates of attrition 
and higher rates of retention. This hypothesis is based on the prior studies of JROTC 
participants in the military. However, promotion of JROTC recruits has never been 
studied so I would hypothesize that they would promote at a slightly higher rate due to 
the training they received in the JROTC program. This training helps a participant 
familiarize themselves with military life and gives them a head start on learning the 
fundamentals of the military.  However, JROTC participants enter the military at higher 
pay grades, and the hierarchical structure of the military limits the number of promotions, 
so JROTC recruits may appear less likely to promote. Table 10 displays the hypothesized 
effect of each of the variables in the basic models, which are based on the previous 
studies discussed in the literature review. 
Table 10.   Hypothesized effects of Explanatory Variables  
 
Variable Attrition Promotion Reenlistment 
Cat Missing + - - 
Cat I - + + 
Cat II - + + 
Cat IIIB + - - 
No education info + - - 
Non high school 
grad 
+ - - 
Some college - + - 
College degree - + - 
Married + + + 
Black - - + 
Mexican - + + 
Puerto Rican - + + 
Cuban - + + 
Latin American - + + 
Other Hispanic - + + 
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descent 
Native American / 
Pacific Islander 
+ - + 
Asian - + + 
Other - - + 
JROTC - + + 
Other Youth 
Programs 































V.  RESULTS 
A.  ONE-YEAR ATTRITION RATES  
 The results of the first year attrition model are presented in Tables 11 and 12. 
Table 11 presents estimates from logistic regressions and Table 12 presents the marginal 
effects obtained from these estimates. Six models of attrition were estimated. The first 
models in columns one and two provides baseline estimates similar to those reported in 
prior attrition studies. The models in columns three and four add indicators for JROTC 
participation, and for participation in other military youth programs. The models in 
columns five and six add interaction variables for all races and ethnic groups with 
JROTC. This model allows the effect of JROTC on the first year attrition to vary by race 
and ethnicity.    
The estimates in Tables 11 and 12 indicate that JROTC participation is associated 
with a lower first year attrition rate, as hypothesized. Other determinants that reduce 
attrition are the CAT I-II groups (higher ability associated with lower attrition). However, 
the partial effects table shows that CAT IIIB recruits had a .68 percentage point higher 
one-year attrition rate then CAT IIIA. The Race/Ethnic results all indicate that minorities 
have a lower one-year attrition rate except for Native Americans who appear to attrite at 
7.22 percentage points higher then whites (base case). Model (5) reveals that Hispanics 
who participate in JROTC have even lower attrition rates than all other minorities. When 
breaking down the Hispanic group into the various ethnic subgroups in model (6) it 
appears that the lower attrition rates for Hispanics in JROTC are driven by Mexican-
American participants. In addition, while Native Americans appear to have higher 
attrition rates, Native Americans who participate in JROTC attrite at a lower rate then 
whites (base case). When looking at the partial effects in Table 12 when the model 
accounts for all minorities and AFQT scores the first year attrition probability is 16.68% 
lower for JROTC participants44  and 12.74% lower for other youth program 
participants45 lower than recruits who participated in no youth programs in high school. 
                                                 
44 Partial Effects divided by the actual one-year attrition rate. 
45 Ibid. 
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Table 11.   Logistic Regression Estimates of One-Year Attrition 
 
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 



























































































    -.4228*** 
(.0158) 
    -.4178*** 
(.0159) 
    
Hispanic 
JROTC 
    -.3198** 
(.1340) 
 





















     -.4236 
(.3559) 









































































































  363,041   363,041   363,041 363,041   363,041 363,041 




3043.9817 3089.0777 3123.5421 3168.9095 3139.9829 3192.2336
R squared  .0083 .0085 .0086 .0087 .0086 .0088 
Note: *** significant at the 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
Table 12.   Partial Effects from One-Year Attrition Models 
 
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 




  -.0218*** -.0220*** -.0218*** -.0220*** 
CAT 
missing 
.2058*** .2061*** .2058*** .2061*** .2056*** .2059*** 
CAT I -.0806*** -.0806*** -.0811*** -.0811*** -.0810*** -.0810*** 
CAT II -.0418** -.0418*** -.0421*** -.0421*** -.0420*** -.0420*** 
CAT IIIB .0068** .0068*** .0068** .0068*** .0068*** -.0068*** 





  -.0108 -.0108 
Hispanic -.0608***  -.0612***  -.0605***  
Hispanic 
JROTC 
      -.0477** 
(.1340) 
 
Mexican  -.0716***  -.0720***  -.0712*** 
Mexican 
JROTC 
     -.0612* 






     -.0612 













     -.2077 
Other 
Hispanic 




     -.0188 







  -.0957** -.0957** 





   
 
-.0257 -.0257 





  -.0884* -.0885 
Sample 
Size 
  363,041   363,041   363,041 363,041   363,041 363,041 
Predicted 
probabilit
y for base 
case 
.20692 .20693 .20798 .20799 .20799 .20780 
YR1 
Attrition  
17.26% 17.26% 17.26% 17.26% 17.26% 17.26% 
Note: *** significant at the 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
B.  FIRST-TERM ATTRITION  
 The models used for first-term attrition are specified the same as those used to 
estimate one-year attrition. Negative coefficients indicate a lower likelihood of attrition 
while positive coefficients indicate that the particular variable increases attrition. The 
results for first-term attrition are presented in Tables 13 and 14.  
As hypothesized, JROTC participants, minorities (except Native Americans), and 
those who score well on the AFQT have lower first-term attrition rates than the base case 
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(white, CAT IIIA, and recruits that did not participated in a youth programs).  The results 
in Table 14 are very similar to the results in the one-year attrition models and indicate 
that those who score higher on the AFQT have lower first year attrition rates. The 
Race/Ethnic results also indicate that minorities have a lower first year attrition rate 
except for Native Americans who appear to attrite at a higher rate. When I controlled for 
all minorities and AFQT scores in model (6) and utilize the partial effect results, the first-
term attrition probability for JROTC participants is 9.13%46 lower and other youth 
programs is 5.58%47 lower than those who participated in no youth programs. First-term 
attrition rates for JROTC and other youth programs are about 7 percentage points lower 
than those with no program participation, respectively, but it still shows that participation 
in JROTC and other youth program participation effectively reduces attrition of recruits 
throughout the first-term. 
Table 13.   Logistic Regression Estimates of First-Term Attrition 
 
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 


































































































    -.1872** 
(.0886) 
 
Mexican  -.5329***  -.5334***  -.5281*** 
                                                 
46 Partial effect divided by the actual first-term attrition rate. 
47 Ibid. 
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(.0182) (.0182) (.0184) 
Mexican 
JROTC 













     .1355 
(.2216) 




































     -.1925 
(.1331) 


































































  363,041   363,041   363,041 363,041   363,041 363,041 




4677.1811 4766.6688 4769.2352 4858.8239 4785.4917 4881.4872
R squared  .0128 .0130 .0131 .0133 .0131 .0134 




Table 14.   Partial Effects From First-Term Attrition models 
 
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 




  -.0221** -.0223** -.0222** -.0224** 
CAT 
missing 
.2177*** .2181*** .2172*** .2176*** .2171*** .2174*** 
CAT I -.0984*** -.0986*** -.0988*** -.0990*** -.0988*** -.0989*** 
CAT II -.0570*** -.0570*** -.0571*** -.0572*** -.0571*** -.0572*** 
CAT IIIB .0125*** .0127*** .0125** .0127** .0126** .0127** 
Black -.0382*** -.0383*** -.0368*** -.0369*** -.0359*** -.0359*** 
Black 
JROTC 
    -.0281** .0281** 
Hispanic 
 
-.1008***  -.1011***  -.1003***  
Hispanic 
JROTC 
    -.0455** 
(.0886) 
 
Mexican  -.1245***  -.1248***  -.1236*** 
Mexican 
JROTC 
     -.0682** 
Puerto 
Rican 




     .0336 
(.2216) 





   .2039 
Latin 
American 




     -.1707 
Other 
Hispanic 




     -.0468 







  -.0348 -.0348 








  -.0708** .0709** 





  -.0871 -.0871 
Sample 
Size 
  363,041   363,041   363,041 363,041   363,041 363,041 
Predicted 
probabilit
y for base 
case 




39.45% 39.45% 39.45% 39.45% 39.45% 39.45% 
Note: *** significant at the 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
C.  PROMOTION TO E4 OR E5  
 The results of the promotion models are presented in Tables 15 and 16. Table 15 
displays the logistic regression estimates and Table 16 displays the marginal effects. 
Positive coefficients indicate that a recruit associated with the predictor variable is more 
likely to promote while a negative coefficient indicates lower promotion rates. 
 The baseline model indicates that those recruits who enter the Navy with college 
degrees, who score higher on the AFQT, and those who are married tend to promote at 
higher rates. Table 16 indicates that those with some college are 6.89 percentage points 
less likely to promote then high school graduates (base case) and females are 4.85 
percentage points less likely to promote then males (base case). Mexican-Americans, 
Latin Americans, Native Americans and Asians all had positive coefficients indicating 
they promoted at higher rates, while blacks, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and females had 
negative coefficients indicating they promote at lower rates. When I included the entry 
pay grade as one of the controls, I was able to control for the effects of JROTC recruits 
entering at higher pay grades. As hypothesized in these models I found that those who 
entered the Navy at higher pay grades had a better chance of promotion to E4 or E5. 
Table 16 model (6) indicates that entering the Navy at E1 reduces your chances of 
promotion to E4 or E5 by 18.57 percentage points when compared to entering an E2 
(base case). When I include in the model all minorities, education levels, AFQT scores, 
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gender, married, race/ethnicity, and pay grade at entry the promotion to E4 or E5 
probability for JROTC participants by year 4 is 10.78%48 lower and for other youth 
programs is 4.31%49 lower than those who participated in no youth programs. This is not 
what I had hypothesized and may require some further research to determine why JROTC 
recruits promote at slower rates. Female and male only models were also created to 
determine if female or male JROTC recruit promote faster or slower then their 
counterparts. However, most results from the models were insignificant and the findings 
didn’t provide me with any information I didn’t already find in Tables 15 and 16.  
 To further explore the factors that determine promotion I examined how each of 
the sample groups promoted over a four-year period. These promotion rates are displayed 
in Table 17.  The table displays promotion only for years 2 through 4 (first year entry pay 
grades were presented in Table 7 above). Interestingly, we see that in year 4 the pay 
grade distribution of the recruits is almost the same. This would explain why entering at a 
higher pay grade doesn’t always guarantee faster promotion. Promotion in the enlisted 
ranks takes three basic variables into account when promoting to the pay grades of E4-
E6: Score on rating exam, time-in-rate, and individual’s rank on personnel evaluations. 
The time-in-rate requirement and evaluations are most likely the reason we see this 
equalizing effect in promotion over time. A longer time-in-rate improves the chances of 
being promoted; also, seniority increases the probability of receiving higher marks on 
evaluations and thus promoting.  
Table 15.   Logistic Regression Estimates of Promotion to E4 or E5 
 
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
















































                                                 








































































































































    -.0013 
(.1046) 
 





















     -.3761 
(.2603) 

































































































































  236,228   236,228   236,228 236,228   236,228 236,228 




148809.49 14824.38 19273.90 19294.87 19265.54 19294.87 
R squared  .0596 .0597 .0784 .0784 .0784 .0784 
Note: *** significant at the 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
Table 16.   Partial Effects From Promotion to E4 or E5 Models 
 
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 




  -.0285*** -.0283*** -.0283*** -.0281*** 
No 
education  




-.0720*** -.0721*** -.0529*** -.0531*** -.0529** -.0531** 
Some 
college 
-.0689*** -.0685*** -.0814*** -.0811*** -.0812*** -.0809*** 
College 
degree 
.0441*** .0445*** -.0402*** -.0396*** -.0401*** -.0395*** 
Married 
year 4 




.0353 .0348 -.0118 -.0124 -.0117 -.0123 
CAT I .1602*** .1603*** .0785*** .0784*** .0783** .0783** 
CAT II .1055*** .1056*** .0672*** .0671*** .0671** .0671** 
CAT IIIB -.0845*** -.0846*** -.0672*** -.0672*** -.0672*** -.0672*** 
Female -.0491*** -.0492*** -.0483*** -.0484*** -.0484*** -.0485*** 
Black -.0671*** -.0670*** -.0624*** -.0624*** -.0641*** -.0641*** 
Black 
JROTC 
    .0374*** .0374*** 
Hispanic 
 
-.0051  -.0043  -.0043  
Hispanic 
JROTC 
    -.0002  
Mexican  .0050  .0069**  .0061 
Mexican 
JROTC 
     .0373 
Puerto 
Rican 




     -.0758 
(.2603) 





   -.2011 
Latin 
American 












     -.0027  







  .0117 .0117 







  -.0007 -.0007 





  .0411 .0411 
E01   -.1212*** -.1213*** -.1210*** -.1211*** 
E03   .0216*** .0217*** .0216*** .0217*** 
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E04   .0228*** .0228*** .0228*** .0228*** 
Sample 
Size 
  236,228   236,228   236,228 236,228   236,228 236,228 
Predicted 
probabilit
y for base 
case 
.69779 .69779 .75534 .75536 .77574 .75575 
Promotion 
rate to E4 
or E5 
65.21% 65.21% 65.21% 65.21% 65.21% 65.21% 
Note: *** significant at the 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
Table 17.   Promotion over 4 years 
 
Pay 


















E1 1.3% 1.78% 1.90% 1.21% 1.07% 1.30% 0.90% .70% .81% 
E2 8.04% 16.94% 34.00% 2.12% 2.46% 2.88% .93% .93% 1.1% 
E3 71.36% 63.34% 47.8% 39.28% 42.53% 49.14% 18.80% 18.75% 19.41%
E4 19.21% 17.67% 16.30% 53.30% 48.88% 42.52% 62.20% 61.56% 61.64%
E5 0% 0% 0% 4.0% 4.70% 3.93% 17.13% 17.58% 16.72%
E6 0% 0% 0% 0% .04% 0.03% 0% .04% .04% 
TOTAL 99.9% 99.73% 100% 99.91% 99.64% 99.8% 99.96% 99.56% 99.72%
Source: Derived from Defense Manpower Data Center Cohort Files  
D.  REENLISTMENT MODELS 
 The results of the reenlistment models are presented in Tables 18 through 21. 
Tables 18 and 20 present the logistic regression estimates, while Tables 19 and 21 present 
the marginal effects for Tables 18 and 20, respectively. Tables 20 and 21 are the 
female/male-only models used to determine the effects of gender. Positive coefficients 
indicate that a recruit associated with the predictor variable is more likely to reenlist 
while a negative coefficient indicates a recruit is less likely to reenlist. 
 Model (6) indicates that recruits who are non-high school graduates, who have 
some college and who enter the Navy with a college degree reenlist at a lower rate then 
high school graduates (base case). However, those who score higher on the AFQT (CAT 
I) reenlist at an 18.66 percentage point higher rate than CAT IIIA (base case) recruits. For 
recruits that were married in year 4, the reenlistment rate is 8.38 percentage points higher 
40 
than for single recruits (base case). The results also indicate that minorities (with the 
exception of Cuban and other race) have higher reenlistment rates then whites (base 
case). The highest rates are for Asians at 14.33 percentage points followed by blacks at 
11.15 percentage points higher than whites. The results also indicate that females reenlist 
at lower rates then males. When the model controls for minorities, education levels, 
AFQT scores, gender, marriage, race/ethnicity, and pay grade at entry the results indicate 
that the reenlistment probability for JROTC participants is 13.03%50 higher and for other 
youth programs is 4.46%51 higher than those who participated in no youth programs. 
 Female and male-only models are estimated and displayed in Table 20 and 21.  
The tables indicate that there are some differences in the effects of the youth program 
variables between the two gender groups, especially in the reenlistment models. The 
tables show that females who participate in JROTC have a higher reenlistment rate then 
other females and males that don’t participate in a youth program (see Table 20 and 21). 
Since the Hispanic ethnic subgroups were insignificant individually, I grouped them 
under a single Hispanic category to simplify the model.  Reenlistment probability for 
female JROTC participants is 6.4%52 higher than males who participated in no youth 
programs and 10.06%53 higher than for females who participated in no youth programs.  
Males who participate in JROTC are 6.76%54 more likely to reenlist than males who 
didn’t participate in a youth program. The results are very interesting because in prior 
studies females have usually been found to have lower reenlistment rates and the Navy is 
always trying to find ways to retain female sailors. 
Table 18.   Logistic Regression Estimates of Reenlistment 
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 



















No -.4305*** -.4302*** -.4317*** -.4314*** -.4317*** -.4314*** 
                                                 
50 Partial effect divided by the actual reenlistment rate. 
51 Ibid. 

























































































































































    -.1498 
(.0143) 
 





















     .0416 
(.2940) 





































     .0164 
(.1514) 


































































219,795 219,795 219,795   219,795 219,795   219,795 




5485.7437 5550.2096 5543.8078 5608.2076 5551.3465 5620.4756 
R squared  .0246 .0249 .0249 .0252 .0252 .0252 
Note: *** significant at the 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
Table 19.   Partial Effects from Reenlistment Models 
 
Variable Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 




  .0263** .0279** .0286** .0279** 
No 
education  




-.0112** -.0106** -.0106** -.0101** -.0107** -.0101** 
Some 
college 
-.0100 -.0097 -.0091 -.0088 -.0092 -.0088 
College 
degree 
-.0666*** -.0679*** -.0657*** -.0670*** -.0658*** -.0671*** 
Married 
year 4 
.0837*** .0836*** .0839*** .0838*** .0838*** .0838*** 
CAT 
missing 
.0553** .0559** -.0560** -.0566** -.0559** -.0565** 
43 
CAT I .1866*** .1869*** .1873*** .1875*** .1873*** .1875*** 
CAT II .0863*** .0865*** .0866*** .0868*** .0866*** .0868*** 
CAT IIIB -.0280*** -.0283*** -.0280*** -.0283*** -.0280*** -.0284*** 
Female -.0093*** -.0091*** -.0096*** -.0094*** -.0095*** -.0094*** 
Black .1124*** .1127*** .1111*** .1114*** .1112*** .1115*** 
Black 
JROTC 
    -.0062 -.0061 
Hispanic 
 
.0423***  .0425***  .0433***  
Hispanic 
JROTC 
    -.0375  
Mexican  .0279***  .0280***  .0295*** 
Mexican 
JROTC 








     .0103 













     -.1744* 
Other 
Hispanic 




     .0040 







  -.0304 -.0040 







  -.0847** -.0303** 





  -.0815 -.0846 
Sample 
Size 
  219,795   219,795   219,795   219,795   219,795   219,795 
Predicted 
probabilit
.53828 .53839 .53671 .53682 .53661 .53667 
44 




62.62% 62.62% 62.62% 62.62% 62.62% 62.62% 
Note: *** significant at the 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
Table 20.   Logistic Regression Estimates of Reenlistment models for All, Females 
only, and Males Only  
 












































































































Sample Size 219,795 36,612 183,183 
-2 Log L 285047.26 48663.867 241859.06 
LR-Test Chi Square 5549.5173 894.7577 5330.6921 
R squared  .0249 .0241 .0287 
Note: *** significant at the 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
 
Table 21.   Partial Effects from Female/Male Reenlistment Models 
 
Variable Baseline (All) Female only model  Male only model 
JROTC .0406*** .0634*** .0426*** 
Other youth 
programs 
.0287** .0109 .0309** 
No education  -.1073*** -.1639*** -.0750*** 
Non-high school 
graduate 
-.0105* -.0208 -.0107** 
Some college -.0089 .0107 -.0134 
College degree -.0655*** -.0306* -.0766*** 
Married year 4 .0840*** -.0197*** .1079*** 
CAT missing .0561** .0586 .0529* 
CAT I .1873*** .1330*** .1942*** 
CAT II .0867*** .0449*** .0951*** 
CAT IIIB -.0279*** -.0263*** -.0279*** 
Female -.0107***   
Female JROTC .0401**   
Black .1111*** .1296*** .1026*** 
Hispanic .0426*** .0817*** .0334*** 
Native  .0642*** .0629*** .0646*** 
Asian .1422*** .1346*** .1456*** 
Other .0805*** .0426 .0898*** 
Sample Size  219,795 36,612 183,183 
Predicted 
probability for base 
case 
.53679 .57109 .52807 
Reenlistment rate 62.62% 61.89% 62.77% 
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VI.  CONCLUSION  
A.  INTRODUCTION  
The primary goal of this thesis has been to determine the effects of JROTC 
participation on the attrition, promotion and reenlistment of Navy enlisted personnel. 
Analysis of the data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) indicate 
that personnel who participated in the JROTC program for 3 or 4 years have lower 
attrition in the first term and have higher reenlistment rates. However, the models 
analyzing promotion to E4 or E5 in the first four years indicate that JROTC participants 
promote more slowly then those who participated in no youth programs.   
B.  IMPLICATIONS OF STUDY  
My thesis concurs with prior studies on JROTC attrition and reenlistment, but the 
information discovered on promotion may need further research to identify what other 
factors may explain why JROTC participants promote at lower rates. It is possible that 
this finding is due to the higher entry grades for JROTC participants and the hierarchical 
structure of the Navy, which limits the number of possible promotions. My findings on 
attrition and reenlistment rates suggest that participants in the JROTC program are more 
likely to complete their initial contracts and to reenlist once they choose the military as a 
career.  
 The JROTC program prepares students for military life by introducing them to 
military training and its ideology. This allows the students to better adapt to life in the 
military. I would expect the JROTC training coupled with their inherent interest in the 
military gives JROTC students a head start on those who did not participate in any youth 
programs. Therefore, the Navy might find it beneficial to target JROTC students in their 
recruitment efforts. I have shown that JROTC recruits attrite less and reenlist at higher 
rates so it benefits the Navy and the JROTC recruit tin two ways.  
C.  FUTURE RESEARCH  
This study provides evidence of positive effects of JROTC participation on 
performance during a Navy recruit’s first-term of service. The next step in this study 
would to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the JROTC program to determine whether 
money savings from better performance and higher reenlistment exceed the Navy’s share 
48 
of the cost of the JROTC program. The cost-benefit analysis should provide the Navy 
with the information to make better decisions on funding and possible expansion of 
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